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sad feature of this father and daughter is that they might have made very 
good friends. He wishes to be in acknowledged contact with another, and, 
thinking he could not have it in the Garden, was willing to give up his 
own existence in its pursuit; whereas she, preferring the solitary existence 
he needed to escape, wants nothing of such interactions, even though 
she desperately seems to need the kind of interpersonal relations which 
would allow her to be loved. (Fortunately, philosophers of religion have 
begun to explore more carefully the relevance of such interpersonal as-
pects, particularly their epistemological relevance: see especially Eleonore 
Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering [Ox-
ford University Press, 2010], esp. chaps. 3–4; and Matthew Benton, “God 
and Interpersonal Knowledge,” Res Philosophica 95 [2018]: 421–447.)
Hudson’s masterful portrayal of these characters manages to blend the 
deeply spiritual and personal needs we all have with the ways in which 
our intellectual reflections can sometimes exacerbate our already fraught 
condition. His book also reminds us that we can learn from one another, 
and even from fictional characters like Tesque and Naphil, if we would 
just enter honestly into such deeply personal discussions. While those can 
be harder to do with real people, the lessons learned from this engaging 
book can help even philosophers do them better.
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ANDREW M. BAILEY, Yale-NUS College, Singapore
For nearly a thousand years, St. Anselm’s ontological argument has exhib-
ited a curious necromantic cycle. Generations of critics declare the argu-
ment dead, only to see the thing reanimated by the cunning incantations 
of a Descartes, a Gödel, or a Plantinga. It must be frustrating.
In this compact and ambitious book, Nagasawa sets out to vindicate 
the ontological argument and the perfect being theology it recommends. 
Nagasawa also aims to refute atheological arguments from evil—and 
other atheological arguments besides. I’m afraid, then, that St. Anselm’s 
critics are in for some more frustration. So too are some theists, I suspect—
for Nagasawa suggests that their tradition is mistaken in insisting on the 
thesis that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.
Nagasawa has published extensively on perfect being theology and re-
lated matters; his views there are already well known to metaphysicians 
and philosophers of religion. And those views haven’t changed much, so 
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far as I can tell. In substance and in style—the prose is direct and un-
adorned throughout—this book contains few surprises. Still, it is good 
to see Nagasawa’s particular spin on perfect being metaphysics system-
atically integrated, updated here or there, and ultimately deployed in the 
service of a novel and positive case for the ontological argument.
The book divides into thirds. In the first, Nagasawa develops perfect 
being theism, according to which there is a God who is the greatest meta-
physically possible being. In the second, Nagasawa argues that standard 
atheological arguments may be refuted by replacing the view that God 
is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent with a version of perfect 
being theism. In the third, Nagasawa defends various formulations of the 
ontological argument and offers a new case for the possibility premise in 
the modal ontological argument.
Thus, the book in broad outline. Let’s slow down and observe in more 
detail. In what follows, I’ll discuss three novel and particularly interesting 
moves Nagasawa makes—one from each third of the book.
Perfect being theism fits nicely with a great chain of being—a ranking 
by greatness of all things big and small, with God at the top (50–52). But 
affirming that chain isn’t easy. It seems to require that everything be com-
mensurable with everything else when it comes to greatness, an implica-
tion that has seemed implausible to many. Which is greater, the critics 
ask—a lampshade or a rainbow? How about an aardvark or an escalator? 
And there are harder cases too: how about a mathematical genius who’s 
bad at music or a musical genius who is bad at math? (73)
Nagasawa replies that these puzzling pairs are either instances of 
equal greatness or that they indeed involve one member of the pair being 
greater than the other—perhaps in ways that are difficult to calculate or 
understand (75–76). So Nagasawa does defend this linear model of great-
ness. But he also supplies an intriguing alternative—a radial model. On 
the radial view, God’s greatness does not consist in resting at the top of 
one chain of all beings. Rather, God’s greatness consists in resting at the 
top of every local chain of non-divine beings, of which chains there may 
be many (62).
It is not enough to say that, on perfect being theism, God is great—
whether by being at the top of the one great chain of being or by being 
at the top of a hoard of local chains. One wants to know the criteria ac-
cording to which God enjoys those elevated positions (63). Nagasawa has 
a good deal to say here and uses diagrams to some effect; of particular 
value are the distinctions he draws between various possible relations 
of relative greatness (59–60) and the interactions between great-making 
properties, especially those that come in degrees (65–70). The position on 
which Nagasawa lands—the maximal God view—has it that God tops off 
the relevant chains by having the maximal consistent set of knowledge, 
power, and benevolence (92). Crucially, this view does not unquestionably 
entail that God is omniscient, omnipotent, or omnibenevolent (93).
BOOK REVIEWS 277
Theists have widely maintained that God is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and omnibenevolent. A standard atheological program, accordingly, takes 
this shape: show that those omni-properties are incoherent or incompat-
ible with some known fact (82–88) and conclude on that basis that there is 
no God. Atheists have argued, for example, that omnipotence is incoher-
ent and so God, conceived as a being that is omnipotent, could not exist. 
And they’ve argued, furthermore, that the various omni-properties are to-
gether incompatible with various imperfections of the actual world—evil, 
suffering, divine hiddenness, and so on. And so God, conceived as a being 
possessed of all the omni-properties, does not exist.
Dozens of atheological arguments take this broad form. They purport 
to target theism, but in fact take aim at omni-properties. Nagasawa has an 
efficient and unified reply—a refutation, he calls it—to all those arguments 
at once. Nagasawa claims that not one of these arguments undermines 
perfect being theism. They may or may not undermine the view that there 
is an omniscient, omnipotent, or omnibenevolent God. But there is “no 
obvious reason to accept” that a maximally great being must have those 
omni-properties, and so the atheological arguments, even if sound, do not 
tell against perfect being theism (90–91). Nagasawa does not, to be clear, 
reject the claims that God is omniscient, omnipotent, or omnibenevolent; 
he claims instead that “this is an open question, on which the cogency of 
perfect being theism does not hinge” (93).
Nagasawa’s refutation may not be as exciting as it initially appears. It 
leaves untouched evidential formulations of the atheological argument 
from evil (86n10)—arguably the most potent of all atheological argu-
ments. And in a way, Nagasawa’s refutation retreads familiar territory. It 
would surprise few (certainly not Professor Mackie) to learn that theism 
may be preserved by giving up on the omni-properties (117). Nagasawa 
is sensitive to this concern, and is careful to note several times over that 
he does not advocate the thesis that God is not omniscient, omnipotent, or 
omnibenevolent (118). Rather, he holds that theists may regard that thesis 
as an open option.
I wonder, though, just how open this option is. Take omniscience. More 
than a few theistic traditions insist that God is omniscient. The Roman 
Catholic Church, for example, teaches as a matter of de fide dogma that 
God’s knowledge is infinite and comprehensive. Could a faithful Catholic 
believer maintain that God’s omniscience is an open question, even though 
the Church teaches with the highest degree of certainty that God knows 
everything there is to know? I don’t think so. And it’s not just Catholics 
or Christians who face this bind. The Qur’an, too, appears to teach that 
Allah is omnipotent. Could a devout Muslim maintain that it is an open 
question whether Allah is omnipotent, even though the Qur’an appears 
to plainly teach as much? This is far from obvious. Theists from some 
Vedic traditions, finally, have commitments here too—the Gītā appears to 
teach that Lord Kṛiṣhṇa is omnipotent. Could a dutiful student of that 
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text follow Nagasawa and say that the degree of power enjoyed by Lord 
Kṛiṣhṇa was an open question or somehow unsettled? Again, this is hard 
to see.
Perhaps the kind of traditionally rooted theist I’ve discussed is not 
Nagasawa’s audience. Could his program appeal to a more rootless or 
purely philosophical theist? I’m not so sure. The God of the Philosophers 
has long been thought to play a variety of theoretical roles. God, we’re 
told, is the explanation for why there is anything at all, the cause of the 
universe’s beginning to exist, the ground of being, the source of moral 
obligation, goodness itself, and so on. It is unclear, to be sure, whether a 
being of any kind can fulfill these roles. But it seems to me that Nagasawa’s 
refutation makes things even worse. For it is even more unclear whether 
those roles can be filled by a being that is not, after all, omniscient, om-
nipotent, or omnibenevolent (or if that being’s omni-property status is an 
open question).
I tentatively conclude that Nagasawa’s refutation—exciting though it 
may seem—comes at a price for a wide range of theists.
The ontological argument comes in various formulations and flavors. 
So too the objections. Nagasawa ably treats a host of these objections in the 
final section. His treatment here is state-of-the-art and often, to my mind, 
convincing. As it turns out, just about every objection requires substantive 
metaphysical or epistemic assumptions—so refuting the argument is just 
as hard as advancing it (152). This is not to say, though, that the argument 
succeeds (180).
But Nagasawa does think one version indeed succeeds—the modal on-
tological argument. Nagasawa models his formulation after Plantinga’s 
(183–184; 204–205). Plantinga distinguishes maximal excellence (being 
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent in a world) from maximal 
greatness (being maximally excellent in every possible world). Maximal 
greatness is possibly instantiated, Plantinga’s argument says, and so by 
some widely accepted modal theorems, maximal excellence is in fact 
instantiated.
Nagasawa likewise distinguishes real maximal excellence (having the 
maximal consistent set of knowledge, power, and benevolence in a world) 
from maximal greatness (being really maximally excellent in every possible 
world). Real maximal greatness is possibly instantiated, Nagasawa’s ar-
gument says, and so by the same widely accepted modal theorems, real 
maximal excellence is in fact instantiated (205).
What’s to say about these arguments? It all comes down to the possibil-
ity premise. Nagasawa offers a brief and friendly survey of five extant 
arguments for that key claim (186–202). This is useful, if only to correct the 
common but dubious claim that the possibility premise begs the question. 
There are, in fact, arguments for that premise, and critics of the modal on-
tological argument would do well to engage them directly. But Nagasawa 
does not rely on extant arguments—none are compelling, he says—to 
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establish the key possibility claim (186). He instead offers his own case for 
the premise. It appears in the penultimate page of the main text:
The maximal God thesis explicates the perfect being thesis by saying that 
God is the being that has the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power, 
and benevolence . . . we can automatically derive that it is possible that God 
exists because here God is understood as the being that has the maximal 
consistent set of knowledge, power, and benevolence. In other words, the 
maximal concept of God is by definition internally coherent. . . . This guaran-
tees the possibility of the existence of God. That is, the possibility of God’s 
existence comes for free given the maximal God thesis.” (204, emphasis 
original)
A neat trick, to be sure. But does it succeed? For two reasons, I’m not san-
guine.
First, note the slide from consistency to possibility. The claim here ap-
pears to be that, if it is consistent that some properties be jointly exempli-
fied then it is therefore possible. But there are familiar reasons to question 
any straightforward inference along these lines. Some sentences have a 
model (and thus satisfy formal definitions of consistency) but nonethe-
less express propositions that cannot be true—think here of “Yujin is a 
prime number.” Maybe I’m being pedantic. Maybe “consistent” just 
means “possible.” Then at least we’d have a valid inference—but hardly a 
convincing one.
Second, note the definite description (“the maximal . . . ”). This appears 
to require that there be just one such maximal consistent set. Is there just 
one such set, though? Is there exactly one combination of knowledge, 
power, and benevolence—a combination falling short of full omniscience, 
omnipotence, and omnibenevolence—greater than any other? Nagasawa 
claims that the burden here lies with the critics (106). So here’s a case. 
It seems to me that a being with {knowledge4.9, power5, and benevo-
lence5} may well be tied for greatness with one who enjoys {knowledge5, 
power4.9, and benevolence5}—much like a musical genius who’s not so 
good at math may well tie for greatness with a math genius who is not so 
good at music. I have no conclusive argument for my judgment about the 
case. But in its light, Nagasawa’s uniqueness assumption isn’t obvious—
certainly not obvious enough to warrant claims to a “free” or “automatic” 
guarantee of God’s possible existence. This is precisely where one would 
hope for argument. Nagasawa, alas, does not oblige.
This is, again, an ambitious book. Will Nagasawa’s arguments signifi-
cantly improve the reception and reputation of the ontological argument? 
Somehow I doubt it. But if you’ve ever found yourself intrigued and an-
noyed by that argument, you’ll find this book a good read. Thanks to this 
book and the literature it will spawn, the ontological argument will no 
doubt continue in its curious cycle. I can’t help but think that St. Anselm 
would be proud.
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The Hiddenness of God , by Michael C. Rea. Oxford University Press, 2018. 
Pp. xii + 198. $ 30.00 (hardcover).
MICHELLE PANCHUK, Murray State University
The Hiddenness of God, an expanded version of Michael Rea’s 2017 Gifford 
Lectures, is an intellectually rigorous and pastorally perceptive book. The 
methodology that Rea employs makes it an exemplary work of confes-
sional philosophy of religion. First, his approach is interdisciplinary. He 
engages thoughtfully not only with contemporary and classical philoso-
phy, but also with the work of theologians and biblical scholars without 
sacrificing any philosophical rigor or speaking condescendingly of work 
in other disciplines. Second, rather than setting aside “existential” ques-
tions to treat divine hiddenness primarily as a logical problem of recon-
ciling faith in a loving God with the reality of human experience, Rea 
offers an insightful philosophical and theological defense of a practical 
and pastoral vision of the love of God for those whose ability to trust God 
has been deeply marred by God’s apparent absence. Given that philoso-
phers and other intellectually savvy people are among those who feel the 
weight of divine hiddenness and who seek answers that satisfy both the 
intellectual challenge and their emotional and spiritual struggle, Rea does 
a great service to the community of faith. Indeed, even at points where 
the argument does not fully persuade (which I shall identify below), one 
gets the sense that Rea has put his finger on the important issues. This is a 
book that I would recommend to my fellow philosophers and to an intel-
lectually curious friend in the throes of anguish over their sense of God’s 
absence, and there is not much higher praise that I could offer a work on 
this topic.
As Rea sees it, the problem of divine hiddenness, in all of its various 
forms, results from violated expectations (25). We suppose we know 
something about how a loving God would behave towards God’s creation, 
and these expectations often go unfulfilled in experience. Our varying as-
sumptions about a loving God’s accessibility to us give rise to number of 
distinct forms of the problem of divine hiddenness. Rea focuses the pres-
ent work on two: one doxastic and one experiential. The doxastic problem 
includes the inconclusive evidence about God’s existence and the (related) 
presence of reasonable and non-resistant non-belief in God (the existence 
of which Rea does not himself acknowledge but includes for the sake of 
argument). The experiential problem is the fact that many who long for a 
sense of God’s loving presence never have this desire fulfilled, and some 
who seek God are so traumatized by their experience that they may lose 
the capacity to relate to God in ways that we usually think of as positive.




In light of such realities, we may conclude that there is no God, that 
God is not loving to all humans, or that our initial expectations about the 
behavior of a loving God were misguided. Although Rea himself does not 
put it in precisely this way, I take his solution to be a combination of the 
latter two. God is not loving, if the term “loving” here refers univocally 
to our human concept of love, and our expectations about how a divine 
being would demonstrate love towards finite beings like us are inappro-
priate. In chapter 3, Rea argues that, despite being largely neglected by 
analytic philosophers of religion, divine transcendence is among the attri-
butes that both perfect being theology and the Christian tradition ascribe 
to God, and that this attribute should be taken seriously in our reasoning 
about the problem of divine hiddenness. In chapter 4, Rea argues for a 
“mid-range” characterization of transcendence. On one hand, he argues 
that pan-symbolism (the thesis that “(i) all true theological discourse is 
metaphorical, and (ii) no theological claim is literally true” [43]) is false. 
On the other hand, neither is it true that “many of God’s intrinsic attributes 
can, even apart from divine revelation, be deeply understood and charac-
terized in literal, univocal terms and be made the literal semantic content 
of human words and concepts” (49). The appropriate understanding lies 
somewhere in between. Rea characterizes mid-range transcendence in the 
following way:
(DT) Divine transcendence is whatever intrinsic attribute of God ex-
plains the fact that intrinsic substantive predications of God or of the 
divine nature that express non-revealed concepts are, at best, ana-
logical (51).
If DT is true, then, apart from revelation, we have reason to believe that 
God is loving, at best, only in an analogical sense. But the descriptions of 
the love that proponents of the problem of divine hiddenness, like J. L. 
Schellenberg, offer assume that God’s love is just like, or at least very simi-
lar to, ideal human love. Thus, the expectations of God’s availability to 
us, which are necessary for the success of the argument from hiddenness, 
are inappropriate. As Rea puts it, “[I]n light of the fact that divine love is 
importantly different from human love . . . arguments like Schellenberg’s 
require for their rational believability a certain kind of defense of their 
theological premises that Schellenberg has not yet produced” (57).
In chapter 5, Rea temporarily sets aside DT to argue that even if God is 
at most “lightly transcendent” (63), we should not conceive of divine love 
as an idealization of (the best forms of) human love as it is often assumed 
to be. According to Rea, to have an attribute in an ideal way involves pos-
sessing it in a way such that all limitations on that attribute are removed. 
That is, “[a] person who loves an individual or group of individuals in an 
ideal way would be unlimited in her desire for union with her beloved, 
unlimited in her desire for the good of her beloved, or both” (69). This is, 
quite obviously, not the way that God does or should love human beings. 
We have no reason to think that humans are the right sorts of beings to 
Faith and Philosophy282
tolerate unlimited union with God (the witness of scripture tells us that 
no one can see God and live). Furthermore, the God of the Christian tradi-
tion is a person. This means that God may well have personal interests and 
desires that have nothing to do with humans and their good. We have no 
reason to think that God’s own personal interests might not sometimes 
come into conflict with the good of some or all humans. Further, it is pos-
sible that God sometimes sacrifices the good of humans for those other in-
terests, just as our own partners, parents, and friends sometimes prioritize 
their own interests above ours. Both points suggest that the expectations 
about God’s love that give rise to the problem of divine hiddenness are 
inappropriate. Rea’s solution to the problem of divine hiddenness in chap-
ters 3 and 4 bears a strong resemblance to the skeptical theist response to 
the problem of evil—our inability to think of a good reason for a loving 
God to be (apparently) absent to some people doesn’t give us any reason 
to doubt that God in fact has one.
Rea devotes the final four chapters of the book to demonstrating that, 
despite our violated expectations, and despite the fact that transcendent 
divine love might not be as much like human love as we assume, it is still 
apt to describe God as loving towards all humans. In chapters 6 and 7, he 
develops a theory of religious experience according to which it results, not 
from direct causal contact with a supernatural stimulus (i.e., God or other 
supernatural reality), but from “cognitively impacted” experience of the 
natural world (where “cognitively impacted” means that our cognition 
either “affects the character or content of the experience itself” or “our 
spontaneous response to the experience” [105]). The upshot of the theory 
is that low-level religious experiences are much more widely accessible 
than often assumed and are not the result of either God’s whim or God’s 
response to human efforts.
The final two chapters attempt to sketch how we might understand a 
hidden God as showing love to those with deeply conflicted relationships 
with God—relationships marred by unfulfilled expectations, experiences 
of religious trauma, or the complete lack of the concept of God. According 
to Rea, God shows love to the first two categories of people by authorizing 
lament and protest against God and to the latter because “simply trying 
to participate in a relationship with God by itself suffices for participa-
tion in a relationship with God” (162). That is, literally everyone, from the 
saint who enjoys mystical experiences of the divine, to those who suffer 
from the effects of religious trauma, to those who lack a concept of God, 
can participate in a positively meaningful relationship with God just by 
trying. Furthermore, Rea follows Marilyn McCord Adams in arguing that 
the crucifixion provides a means by which horrendous sufferings such as 
those associated with religious trauma can ultimately be defeated.
There is much to appreciate in this book, but insofar as I have anti-
theodic leanings (and a related tendency to reject attempts to offer a solu-
tion to the problem of divine hiddenness), I’m tempted to gesture broadly 
at the entire project, objecting to its very existence. Instead, I will proceed 
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more constructively by raising a worry about the project of chapter 5 and 
then reflecting on its implications for the rest of the book.
While I think the discussion of divine personhood in chapter 5 contrib-
utes positively to the overall conversation, I’m skeptical about its success 
as an argument that even those who reject DT in favor of “light transcen-
dence” lack justification for the expectations on divine love that motivate 
the hiddenness problem. Insofar as Rea’s characterization of ideal love (as 
I described it above) is what intellectuals and lay people mean when they 
talk about God’s supreme or ideal love for humanity, I think he is cor-
rect. God clearly does not and should not have an unlimited desire for our 
good or desire unlimited union with us. But I suspect that what many actu-
ally mean (or at least what they should mean) when they talk about God’s 
“ideal” love is something more akin to the Aristotelian notion of virtue. 
On this way of construing the common view, if God loves humans per-
fectly or ideally, then God desires union with us and desires our good in 
the appropriate way, to the appropriate degree, and in the appropriate sense. 
“Ideal,” then, is used (perhaps misguidedly) to indicate that God’s love 
is not marred by the sins and vices that distort fallen human love. If we 
accept DT, then I think we have to follow Rea in acknowledging that we 
have little-to-no understanding (apart from revelation) of what it looks 
like for a transcendent divine being to love humans in an appropriate 
way, to an appropriate degree, in an appropriate sense. If DT is true, the 
problem of divine hiddenness does not defeat belief in God’s existence 
or in God’s love (where “love” is used analogically). However, Rea states 
that this chapter operates on the assumption that God is at most “lightly 
transcendent.” That is, discourse about God’s nature and God’s intrinsic 
properties can be literally and univocally true. On this assumption, while 
divine love might not be exactly the same as human love, the concept 
“loving” can be univocally applied to God and the truth conditions for 
the proposition “God loves all humans” should be roughly continuous 
with the truth conditions for propositions about human love. It seems to 
me exceedingly reasonable, if not rationally required, to think that God’s 
pursuing God’s own personal interests at the expense of meeting the most 
basic spiritual needs of the human beings God has created would be very 
strong evidence that the propositions “God loves all human beings” is not 
literally true.
One might respond in the following way: although it sometimes hurts 
our feelings when our partners, parents, or friends prioritize their own 
interests over our own (as Rea himself points out), in moments of cool 
reflection most of us acknowledge that it is appropriate, even good, for 
them to do so. Could we think something similar is true with respect to 
God? Obviously we could. The question is to what degree a lover can ne-
glect the interests of the beloved in favor of other interests and still count 
as a lover in a literal, univocal sense. Consider the following example. If, 
upon reflection, a potential parent recognizes that the pursuit of their own 
goods or some other greater goods would render it impossible for them to 
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meet the most basic and important relational and emotional needs of a po-
tential child (and that there is no one else who might satisfy those needs in 
the parent’s absence), then it seems that the only way to avoid the charge 
of being an unloving parent is for the potential parent to either sacrifice 
(some of) their own interests or other goods for the sake of the child or to 
refrain from bearing a child to begin with. Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
children whose parents have neglected their most basic emotional needs 
and physical well-being in order to pursue some other great good (e.g., 
serving and living among the homeless in an impoverished area, seeking 
peace in a war zone, etc.) to criticize these parents for their failure with 
respect to parental love. Their criticism, of course, is not that their parent’s 
love should have been unlimited, or even that the parent shouldn’t have 
sacrificed some of child’s good to pursue other goods. The criticism is that 
the parent failed to meet some minimum threshold of loving concern for 
the wellbeing of their child. Allowing the child to express their anger, to 
love their parent as far as they understand them, or even defeating the suf-
fering of childhood by somehow incorporating that suffering into a posi-
tively meaningful relationship with them in adulthood does not change 
this fundamental failure as a parent. Similarly, if God is not transcendent 
in a sufficiently strong sense, and if we lack reason to think that human 
goods are somehow served by divine hiddenness (as Rea suggests they 
need not be), then I think it stretches the human concept of love beyond 
recognition to ascribe it to a God who knowingly brings humans into ex-
istence whose most basic spiritual goods, needs, and desires God intends 
to sacrifice for some other, possibly greater, goods. The problem is not the 
existence of limits on divine love, but a failure to meet some minimum 
requirement. “God is loving towards victims of religious trauma” appears 
to be literally false, regardless of what protest God authorizes and even if 
God ultimately defeats the suffering inflicted by God’s apparent absence 
to them.
Obviously, Rea himself does endorse DT, DT is in fact central to the argu-
ment of the book, and the rest of the book is devoted to defusing the force 
of just such negatively-valenced analogies as I offer here. They do so sen-
sitively and poignantly. Whether the work of those chapters is sufficient 
to assuage the worries I raise here will depend on the degree to which the 
reader is willing to stretch the human conception of love in analogous and 
metaphorical usage. It is open for a reader to acknowledge that if DT is 
true, then divine hiddenness does not defeat belief in God’s existence or 
belief in God’s transcendent goodness, but to nonetheless maintain that to 
say that such a God is loving, even analogically or metaphorically, danger-
ously distorts our important human conception of love (especially since 
religious individuals are so prone to take God’s love as an example on 
which to model their own love). Perhaps it is better to say that God is shlov-
ing toward us, where shloving refers to whatever transcendent attribute is 
analogous to human love. Perhaps, as Rea shows through the last four 
chapters, God’s shlove is not nothing. Perhaps it is more than finite, fallen 
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humans deserve. Perhaps we can raise no legitimate complaints against 
God for not loving us. Still, shlove isn’t what many hoped for (especially 
those who have been deeply harmed as a result of seeking God), and to 
our human eyes it may pale in the light of the love we sometimes receive 
from the finite, fallen humans.
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The Christian Idea of God: A Philosophical Foundation for Faith , by Keith Ward. 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. 229. $ 32.99 (paperback).
JORDAN WESSLING, Fuller Theological Seminary
The Christian Idea of God is the third installment of Keith Ward’s systematic 
Christian philosophical theology. However, the book is self-contained and 
meant to stand alone as an exposition and defense of “personal idealism,” 
for the purpose of providing a solid philosophical foundation for Chris-
tian belief. In Ward’s usage, “idealism” refers to the perspective that “mat-
ter cannot exist without mind and depends upon mind for its existence” 
(1). And while Ward never unpacks this dependency relation in detail, it is 
clear that the form of idealism that Ward defends allows for the existence 
of material objects, so long as they are sustained by mind in some way, 
in contrast to a thoroughgoing immaterialism of the kind that is often at-
tributed to Bishop Berkeley. Roughly stated, personal idealism is the view 
that there is one personal supreme mind—one that knows, thinks, feels, 
and intends—on which everything else in the world depends. By design, 
the offered cumulative case for philosophical idealism does not rise to the 
level of argumentative rigor typified by journals of analytic philosophy. 
Instead, the aim is to present a broad framework with wide explanatory 
scope and practical import. The result is a highly readable exploration 
of the contours of a comprehensive worldview, which provides a natural 
home for the Christian faith.
The book contains three parts. In the first part of the book, Ward 
contends that conscious experience is the best starting point for human 
knowledge. And when a human scrutinizes her conscious experience, she 
discovers that sense perceptions, thoughts, and feelings are different in 
kind than that which is spatially located and publicly observable, and that 
these mental states are immaterial and possessed by a unitary subject who 
persists across time and performs intentional actions. Here it seems that 
Ward affirms some form of substance dualism regarding humans, where 
the mental and physical are distinct yet tightly integrated, but Ward is not 
as forthcoming with the details as one would like and expect.
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Examining the nature of human conscious experience more fully, Ward 
contends that the hypothesis that a Supreme Mind exists makes sense 
of key features of human experience. To make his case, Ward draws a 
distinction between an inferential hypothesis and an interpretative hypoth-
esis. The former “is one that explains some observed phenomenon by 
postulating an unperceived, or even unperceivable, entity or state” (51). 
An example of such a hypothesis is that the universe began with a “Big 
Bang.” This widely held hypothesis cannot be perceived by humans, but 
is inferred from observations, such as the cosmic microwave background 
and the red shift of expanding star systems. By contrast, an interpretative 
hypothesis “is one that interprets some experienced reality in terms of 
concepts that do not derive simply from the observations in themselves” 
but “introduces concepts that enable perceived data to be interpreted in a 
particular way” (51). An example of this kind of hypothesis can be found 
in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant postulates catego-
ries of thought, such as concepts of causality and substance, as necessary 
conditions for the possibility of human knowledge of objects in the exter-
nal world. Such categories of thought are not derived by first noticing a 
range of sense perceptions and then postulating a hypothesis to explain 
this range of perceptions. Rather, such categories are used as necessary 
preconditions for interpreting perceptions of the world—or so says Kant. 
While one might justly complain that the nature and relevance of the dis-
tinction between these two kinds of hypotheses are not given the care they 
merit, Ward postulates the existence of a Supreme Mind as an interpre-
tative hypothesis. He argues that a Supreme Mind provides a plausible 
interpretative hypothesis that explains the intelligibility of the universe, 
the objectivity of beauty and moral goodness, and the mysterious but per-
sistent sense that a personal presence pervades our world. The argument 
for this conclusion comes quick, various complexities are brushed aside, 
and competing hypotheses are given little attention. Still, for those who 
take on board many of Ward’s assumptions, the argument does come with 
a good measure of intuitive force.
The second part of the book further examines the idea of a Supreme 
Mind as the foundation of the universe. Ward argues that the existence of 
a Supreme Mind naturally explains why the cosmos generates complex 
semantic information of the kind that is found in human minds, and, in 
addition, the Supreme Mind grounds many, if not the full range of, modal 
truths. That the Supreme Mind grounds necessary truths reveals that it 
must exist necessarily, since only a necessary being has the resources for 
explaining why necessary states of affairs are the case. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Mind creates so that it might realize values outside of itself, but 
also so that it might progressively “unfold” its “own nature, as a truly 
creative, dynamic, and relational reality” (137). Here Ward sees a connec-
tion between the Supreme Mind and the God of Christian Scripture who 
is especially identified with self-giving love. Such a God perhaps “has to 
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create some universe of freely creative and interacting minds if God is to 
express the divine nature as love” (135).
Throughout the second section of the book (and elsewhere for that 
matter), Ward speaks of God, or the Supreme Mind, as a kind of “self-
unfolding” Spirit that realizes itself progressively by “expressing” itself in 
and through a developing creation. Unfortunately, it is not clear to what 
Ward’s conception of God amounts, as key concepts are left unexplained. 
The language of a self-unfolding God who is expressed in an evolving 
creation suggests a kind of process panentheistic perspective. However, 
Ward seems equally willing to embrace traditional attributes of God that 
do not normally accompany that perspective, such as incredible power, if 
not omnipotence. In the absence of a clear articulation of what God is en-
visioned to be like, the reader is left to guess about the details of the book’s 
central explanatory hypothesis.
Having presented a philosophical argument for a Creator, Ward, in the 
book’s third section, turns to theological matters found in Christian revela-
tion. The topics treated include the final judgment, the world to come, and 
the interrelation between reason and revelation, among others. Ward pres-
ents a compelling case for the idea that God must hold humans accountable 
for their sins, and so must punish those who refuse to align themselves with 
God’s ways of love. However, a perfectly loving God would be a God who 
is eternally inclined toward forgiveness and reconciliation. Consequently, 
any punishment inflicted by God would be remedial, not vindictive and 
retributive, which makes it possible that universal human salvation will 
eventually transpire in the life hereafter.
Interestingly, Ward’s conception of the life to come differs markedly 
from that which has been popularized by the likes of N. T. Wright and 
J. Richard Middleton. Whereas the latter authors stress a continuity be-
tween this life and the life to come in that God will heal and restore this 
creation, Ward, relying on St. Paul, stresses the otherworldly nature of the 
redeemed state. Without denying the physicality of the heavenly state al-
together, Ward imagines that the new bodies that redeemed humans will 
inherit will be dramatically different than the physical objects we currently 
bump into on a daily basis. One is left with the impression that heaven 
will be a mostly spiritual reality, where the limitations of physicality are 
left behind.
The final chapter of the book is entitled “Reason and Revelation.” There 
Ward offers an experiential and gradualist understanding of revelation. 
Revelation is experiential in that God, the Supreme Mind on which all 
of reality depends, can be encountered through the manifold values had 
by creation and through an awareness that there is a personality, or at 
least some majestic presence, that encompasses the cosmos. And while 
Christians believe that God’s revelation culminates in the person and 
ministry of Jesus Christ (which is not in itself any kind of experience), 
the New Testament writings are based upon unique experiences of God 
in Christ. Revelation is gradualist in the sense that God patiently works 
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with humans to deepen their perceptions and thoughts over time, rather 
than “simply ignoring them or replacing them with miraculous divine 
knowledge” (217). Given this divine way of dealing with creatures, “we 
might expect that there would be a number of different philosophical and 
evaluative viewpoints among early humans and that they would develop 
in differing ways in different cultures and histories” (217). This develop-
mental understanding of revelation thereby enables us to affirm aspects 
of revelation in more than one religion or philosophical system, and it 
explains why Christian Scripture contains images of God that are subopti-
mal and inaccurate and why the Church has failed to recognize important 
moral truths in her history.
Ward is clear that he does not believe that personal idealism, as ex-
pressed in his preferred manner, is taught or entailed by Christian Scrip-
ture. Nevertheless, Ward believes that personal idealism is consistent with 
Scripture and that it renders it natural to expect that God would reveal 
Godself in some form. Ward thus concludes the book by saying that 
“personal idealism provides a sound rational and reflective basis” for the 
Christian faith, and that in this way “reason and faith embrace and enfold 
each other” (221).
As intimated, those looking for penetrating analyses and rigorous de-
fenses of key concepts will be disappointed by Ward’s book. Indeed, one 
of the weakest aspects of The Christian Idea of God is that it is unclear as to 
what, precisely, personal idealism is and how it contrasts with compet-
ing conceptions of God. Nevertheless, the book lays out a comprehensive 
worldview in an engaging, winsome, and concise fashion, and Ward pres-
ents several interlocking reasons to believe it true, or at least reasonable. 
Besides that, the book is sprinkled with creative proposals for integrating 
the deliverances of the natural sciences into Ward’s personal idealism as 
well as insights into how the Christian faith might be placed into dialogue 
with alternative religious outlooks. For such reasons, I recommend the 
book to those who are interested in obtaining a systematic perspective of 
the fundamental structure of reality and its relation to the Christian faith.
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